(Religious) belief and atheism from a semiotic viewpoint by Lepik, Peet
48 Peet Lepik
(Religious) belief and atheism from 
a semiotic viewpoint
Peet Lepik
Tallinn University
e-mail: signans@gmail.com
Abstract. Th e article attempts to give a semiotic defi nition of the intellectual attri-
butes of belief (in its broader sense), religious belief and atheism, treating all three of 
them as sign systems – cultural languages.
To defi ne the formal structure of the phenomenon of religion, fi ve aspects of 
the corresponding communicative act should be considered – the orientational, 
the sign-creating, the cognitive, the teleological and the energetic ones. Belief as an 
orientational act cannot be treated without including autocommunication: the I-you 
relation is accompanied by the I-I relation in the form of vertical and horizontal to-
pological imaginations. Th e sign-creating aspect of belief is expressed, on the one 
hand, in the performative characteristics of utterances (utterance = act) and, on the 
other hand, in symbolic mnemonic programming. As a cognitive act, communica-
tion typical of belief is mythological, expressing identifi cation with the addressee 
and the subjective eternity of the relation. Teleologically, belief is connected with the 
existential projection; energetically we treat belief as energeia – the creative force of 
man. Relying on the Scriptures and theological literature (mainly the works of Paul 
Tillich), the article analyses the appearance of all these communicative characteris-
tics in religious sign-creating.
Atheism as negation of God is formally an antithetic structure of thinking, which 
is characterized by the symmetry of the antithetic plus-side with the intellectual cha-
racteristics of the minus-side. Based on the characteristics of belief, it is particularly 
interesting to observe how Marx (and his disciples) have “furnishedˮ the orienta-
tional, teleological and energetic characteristics of atheism, and how the dedicative 
structure of thinking has also given birth to earthly gods.
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1. Introduction
Th e following analysis aims to use semiotics in order to describe belief, religiosity 
and God-denial (atheism). Th is article analyses divinitas (divine nature) through 
the concept of humanitas (here in the meaning of ‘human sign-creation’), and this 
is interpreted as a linguistic communicative phenomenon that manifests itself in 
the operations of the intellect. It is important to emphasize that such an approach 
does not contrast the intellect-based approach to religiosity with the theological 
one – for the simple reason that everything that is aft erworldly and revelational can 
in principle reach a person’s thoughts only in the form of a sign, and the intellect 
fi xes these as sign structures. Such an approach excludes the question of questions: 
does God exist (as an ontological formation), since for this question the subject of 
analysis in these contexts can indeed only be semiosis, i.e. the formally expressed 
relationships of a sign (signifi er, e.g. a word) with what is being signifi ed – even if it 
be God himself. 
2. The status quo of the fi eld of research
Th e collision between various persuasions, of various concepts of the world, includ-
ing the acceptance or denial of God, certainly is a natural and genuine part of cul-
ture. Confl icts of ideas have always been indicative of the viability of a culture. A 
culture with homogeneous views is destined to fail – as proven in theory and also by 
history; in actual fact, it is unthinkable.
One of the “voices” in the intra- and inter-cultural dialogue of humanity has 
been atheism – the negation of God, about which there have been various mutu-
ally contradictory teachings during the course of history. Even the faith of a foreign 
or a subjected (hostile) people has oft en been termed atheism – in contrast to one’s 
own, “genuine” faith. In the Roman Empire, for example, there were many faiths 
that were generally permitted, including Christianity; but everybody who refused to 
follow the rituals of worshipping the Roman emperor as a god in addition to their 
own faith was kept under surveillance as a god-denier. Christians labelled all pagan 
faiths as hostile to God. Spinoza was excommunicated as an “atheist” due to his pan-
theistic teachings (God = Nature as the totality of everything); Goethe was vilifi ed 
for the same reason. Th e French Enlighteners called themselves deniers of God and 
religion; strangely, however, most of them did believe in a universal intellect that 
had been concealed in the world by the Creator and was obligatory for all (in their 
opinion, God had simply not interfered in worldly matters since the act of creation). 
Robespierre supplemented this conviction with the idea of a cult: he even intended 
to install altars to reason… Ludwig Feuerbach, the 19th century giant of materialism 
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who passionately attacked the theological concept of the existence of a transcen-
dental God, nevertheless developed a parallel theoretical schema of anthropothe-
ism, whereby an earthly godlike person’s belief in the power of his all-encompassing 
love for humanity is elevated to the “religion of humanity”.1 When one also consid-
ers the utopian and fi nalistic model of communism, as constructed at one time by 
the young Karl Marx, it becomes apparent that drawing a line between religion and 
atheism is defi nitely not a simple task.
Since the vagueness of diff erentiating between religiosity and God-denial was 
particularly apparent in the Soviet doctrine of atheism, I shall proceed primarily 
from this in describing the status quo of the fi eld of research. In Soviet atheistic writ-
ings (but not only there), a tradition existed of defi ning religion “as a refl ection of 
reality through fantastically illusionary pictures, imaginings and concepts” (Novikov 
1985: 383). However, a “belief in the existence of a supernatural reality” was also 
considered a “basic characteristic” of religion (Novikov 1985: 383). 
It is indisputable that the characteristic of all persuasions that bear a religious 
function is not a belief in the “supernatural”. Th e defi nition of religion, as cited 
above, indicates that it is restricted in its scope. Besides a (transcendental) being or 
substance that is outside time and space being worshipped as a god (or as having 
the status of a god), historical ancestors, nature as whole consisting of objects, or 
single real objects in nature [animals, heavenly bodies (the Sun) etc.] have also been 
worshipped. In addition to the Roman emperor, the rulers of other peoples have 
also been deifi ed (in Babylonia, Egypt, Russia, China, etc.). Leo Tolstoj had a pro-
found belief in love as an eternal good but, in order to experience it, man had to fi rst 
overcome his bestial nature. Love is “life itself ”, wrote Tolstoj, “but not a mindlessly 
moribund life, but a blissful and endless one” (Tolstoj 1984: 89). In his opinion “True 
religion is that relationship, in accordance with reason and knowledge, which man 
establishes with the infi nite world around him, and which binds his life [including 
love – P. L.] to that infi nity and guides his actions” (Tolstoj 1950: 163). Such views 
cannot be considered to be “belief in the supernatural” or “fantastically illusion-
ary”; Tolstoj, however, does accept the teachings of Christ, in particular within the 
bounds of these views. Th erefore, a “belief in the existence of a supernatural reality” 
(i.e. a spiritual substance that exists separately from a person) is not a characteristic 
of all systems that are considered to be religious, and cannot therefore be a “basic 
characteristic”.
In addition to the scope of the defi nition remaining vague or questionable, the 
same can be said about interpreting the religious content of the terms ‘supernatural’, 
1 Feuerbach accepts religious belief only on the level of human relationships, which means 
that, in his human-centred theory, the concept of religion does not match the concept generally 
used in theology and in atheism.
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‘illusionary’, ‘fantastic’ and ‘belief ’ (religious) (including the criteria for the mutual 
categorization of the fi rst three). Th e above-mentioned glossary of atheism states 
that ‘religious belief ’ is a “conviction in the actual existence of supernatural beings, 
characteristics and relationships, which is not founded on logical decisions and sci-
entifi c data” (Novikov 1985: 85). Th is is an understanding that is also familiar to 
the contemporary reader. It is further explained as an “emotional attitude”, an “illu-
sionary, practical relationship” with the object; and Novikov adds that the object 
of religious conviction is “vitally important” to the believer (Novikov 1985: 85). By 
taking such determinations as a basis, however, even the repository of thoughts of 
a substantial proportion of humanity could be declared a religion. Th e French phi-
losopher Gaston Bachelard analyses in detail the substantial content of imagina-
tion as concerns houses, cellars, attics, acute and obtuse angles, wardrobes, draw-
ers, seasons, light and many other objects and phenomena. He treats imagination 
as a “psychic potency” but also as a “cosmic power”. Bachelard accords the power of 
imagination to objects and to nature as a whole. However, he refuses on principle to 
prove his imaginings scientifi cally or to argue rationally. It can be clearly seen that 
such a philosophy is in precise accordance with the “basic characteristics” of reli-
gion: Bachelard relies on the conviction that a spirit exists outside a person, i.e. that 
the ‘supernatural’ actually exists; it “refl ects reality through fantastically illusionary 
images, imaginings, concepts”; it presents prescriptions that can be applied in prac-
tice, on how to deal with “spiritual beings”, describes the emotions that they arouse, 
and emphasizes their “vital importance” (Bachelard 1994). Nevertheless, it is also in-
tuitively clear that the French philosopher’s model of the world (understandably, one 
amongst many similar ones, and not the only one!) and religion are very diff erent 
things, as are Bachelard’s attitude to the world and religious belief.
Th is defi nition unavoidably leads to the identifi cation of religious belief with 
belief in the wider context. Th e general concept of ‘belief ’ needs to be commented 
on, using atheistic determinations as a basis. Th e Soviet-era vocabulary of athe-
ism has accorded this term three meanings. Th e fi rst of these – ‘creed’ (Buddhism, 
Christianity, etc.) does not generate objections. Secondly, ‘blind faith’ is defi ned. 
Th is was supposed to be “a specifi c attitude regarding actual or imaginary objects 
and phenomena (and the applicable mental state)”, according to which they are con-
sidered to be “believable and true without theoretical and practical proof ”. Such a 
category of belief (or blind faith) is contrasted with knowledge. “Religious belief, 
where the subjects are god, angels, the other world, the immortality of the soul, dog-
mas, etc., is, in fact, such a phenomenon” (Novikov 1985: 84). In addition to “blind 
faith” a third meaning is also provided: the “term ‘belief ’ is also used to designate the 
conviction based on knowledge that is held by a person, the certainty regarding the 
trueness of these or other scientifi c or social-political ideas” (Novikov 1985: 84).
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One notices the formal errors and the vagueness of terms. Th ere is no eff ort to 
distinguish between “deeming something believable” = argumented reliability and 
‘belief ’; ‘blind faith’ (similarly to the previously cited ‘religious faith’) is defi ned 
through denial; there is no point in trying to comprehend how “specifi c attitude” and 
its “applicable mental state” actually diff er, and what is the content of either. What is 
more than questionable is making belief, as an ‘attitude’, dependent on theoretical 
and practical evidence. For example, an ordinary person in the medieval period did 
not see the earthly world as “natural” or as a contrast to the “supernatural” heav-
enly one – both worlds merged into one since the “supernatural” was indeed natural. 
Th e realm beyond was considered to be just as concrete as the worldly environment; 
Dante fi nding himself in hell – whilst still on earth – was not necessarily seen as a 
metaphor2. Combined, it was still ‘reality’, but heavenly and earthly reality was in a 
way assessed hierarchically: the world beyond the grave was believed to be (in the 
cultural tradition) “more real” in value because “it is not aff ected by time”.3 
Th e fact that a person’s thinking (not to mention belief) cannot be reduced to sci-
entifi c thought has been long confi rmed. Nowadays there is increasing attention paid 
to the heterogeneity of thought, to various types of thinking. A person who believes 
that his homeland is the best place in the world surely cannot be considered to be 
fettered by “blind faith” just because he does not theoretically and practically prove 
this “specifi c attitude”. And what is the point of evidence when a person just believes 
or loves? And what about ‘belief ’ when the theoretical argumentation – from the 
logical aspect – is faulty, one-sided, simply wrong or historically limited? Clarity will 
arrive – in practice or on the basis of other theories – somewhat later, sometimes in 
a century (or more)! Should such a belief be considered post factum to belong to the 
category of “blind faith”, where it lacks the quality of “conviction” and “certainty”? 
Julien O. de La Mettrie and other scholars of the Enlightenment, in accordance with 
their atheistic views, considered such a world view to be true according to which 
nature, including the human psyche, is subordinate in its entirety to the laws of me-
chanics. “Man is a machine”, de La Mettrie opined in his book bearing the same title 
(1748). Pierre-Simon Laplace, member of the French Academy of Sciences and a still 
highly-regarded astronomer, mathematician and physicist, believed – in the same 
spirit of materialistic monism – that knowing everything about atoms would make 
it possible to forecast history unambiguously (Lyubishchev 1977: 135). It is unlikely 
that the lack of scientifi c validity of Laplace’s belief could have infl uenced the “con-
viction” and “certainty” of its supporters. And who should have been the authority, 
2 Cf Dante’s verses Io non mori’ e non rimase vivo (“I was neither dead nor living”). Dante 
Alighieri. Th e Vision of Hell, XXXIV: 25; http://world.std.com/~wij/dante/inferno/inf-34.
html.
3 For more detail, see Gurevich 1985: 6, 72. 
 (Religious) belief and atheism from a semiotic viewpoint  53
standing outside history, who could then have directed attention to his errors – from 
the position of (absolute) truth?
Since similar examples, in succession, can be drawn from the history of science 
and since there are fi elds of intellect (e.g. artistic, mythological, magical conscious-
ness), where such “evidence” is excluded on principle, it must be unavoidably con-
cluded – on reading the many atheistic defi nitions of belief – that humans and hu-
manity have overwhelmingly and consistently been struck blind – i.e. fettered by 
“blind faith”; it also becomes apparent that “blind faith” has been a considerably wid-
er concept than “religious belief ”.
Th e theoretical impasse that is described here has occurred because (1) one has 
implicitly proceeded from the presumption that a person orientates in the world 
only on the basis of scientifi c decisions and scientifi cally justifi ed practices (and in 
doing so, everyday consciousness is unjustifi ably elevated to the level of scientifi c 
thought); (2) the quality of belief (‘blind faith’, ‘conviction’, ‘certainty’) is made de-
pendent on the accordance of the object of the belief to criteria that are scientifi c 
or a certain theoretical concept; (3) religious belief (and belief, in general) is ana-
lysed in terms of scientifi c perception, and of its practice, resulting in fi nding out 
only what belief is not: (a) belief is condemned as the opposite to science that denies 
the “distortion” of the world – therefore, condemned as a distortion of science, or to 
be more precise, as its antithesis; or (b) it is treated as an attribute of “convincing” 
knowledge (it is diluted in knowledge). 
3. The concept of value. Religious belief as a value
Th e practice of the atheistic defi nition of religious belief, where belief is treated as 
a scientifi cally defi cient act of consciousness, avoids the other and very important 
characteristic of religion – the existential basic essence that has been forming spiri-
tual values and moral self-regulation for thousands of years. 
Value and scientifi c truth are fundamentally diff erent. Science aims to recon-
struct the world, ascertain the laws of nature and observe the characteristics of ontic 
objects as they exist – beyond the individual opinions, sympathies and antipathies of 
the subject under observation.4 Values, however, are assessable and subjective.
Th ere is a notably large number of values to be found in any culture, where 
the subjects are no longer even aware of their rating (e.g. forms of politeness) but 
which they and/or their society consider obligatory for its members, or which are 
oft en followed automatically, as a matter of habit, as being elementary. Th is type of 
“hidden” value is termed a norm, which has quite a conservative nature, but which 
4 Th e potential questionability of this claim is not a subject of this analysis.
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also guarantees the homeostatic stability of a culture and the continuity of cultural 
memory.
Regarding normativity, the most obvious social institutions everywhere have al-
ways been religious institutions (in Christianity, the Church), the dogmas that have 
been formed on their territory, and the ethical and aesthetic norms that ensure the 
cohesion of generations and have taken root in the society’s value systems. Th at the 
source of many of these norms is the Bible or church tradition no longer occurs to 
most people. Setting the culture of humanity (including the moral norms of a cul-
ture) in opposition to religion demonstrates illiteracy – even stupidity. Th e Bible has 
been the source of European culture (even the basis, it could be said), and has more 
or less a normative meaning for everyone. From the viewpoint of the creed itself, 
however, this conceals a value that is everlasting and excludes alternatives: the Truth.
Th erefore, we could initially (on superfi cial examination) relate religious belief 
to the concepts of value and norms. Indeed, religiosity and religion in society is an 
evaluative, orientational (regulative), collective (social), culturally consistent (retro-
spective and accumulative) and normatizing phenomenon that is beyond scientifi c 
cognition.
However, the previous discussion has not clarifi ed the actual relationship be-
tween ‘belief ’ (in the wider meaning of the concept), ‘religious belief ’ and “religious” 
belief (as the reader has already seen, phenomena are termed ‘religious’ when they 
diff er from historically formed confessional creeds), which all could be correlated, to 
a varying extent, to the concept of value. Initially, we should concentrate on what is 
the common basis for the three concepts mentioned – belief as an intellectual phe-
nomenon and the formal semiotic characteristics that express belief.
4. Belief from a phenomenological viewpoint
Th e phenomenological analysis of belief presumes the treatment of belief as a phe-
nomenon of the intellect. Th erefore, the possible object of belief that remains ex-
ternal to consciousness, and all phenomena and stimuli associated with belief that 
reside outside the intellect, as already noted, can be of interest to us when they are 
provided in sign form in operations of the intellect.
As formulated by Juri Lotman, the intellect has the “power, fi rstly to store and 
mediate information (the intellect has a memory and communication mechanism) – 
it has linguistic ability [in addition to natural languages, also other cultural-linguistic 
sign systems analogous to language – P. L.], which makes it possible to form orderly 
messages. Secondly, [the intellect has] the ability to transform these messages in an 
orderly manner with the aid of algorithmized operations. Th irdly, [the intellect has] 
the ability to create new messages” (Lotman 1978: 3).
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Following on from this set task, we are interested in the intellect as a “grammati-
cal” mechanism that carries out algorithmized signed operations. We proceed from 
the hypothesis that in various epistemological situations this mechanism “works” ac-
cording to various formal rules. For example, in looking at a painting or the sun, or 
listening to a fugue, a shepherd’s horn or a nightingale, the subject perceives (fi xes) 
in one object at least two objects, at the same time (simultaneously): one generates 
a “playful” association with the other(s), conditionally assimilating with it (them). 
Th us a metaphoricity (awareness of dual meaning through teamwork) is created, 
which, as regards the basic formal linguistic characteristics, is the formal basis of the 
intellect’s aesthetic perception.5 And there is no need to doubt that this mechanism – 
on the basis of which the “grammar” of, for example, games, puzzles and humour, 
not to mention all the fi ne arts, has developed – is the universal sign-creating, aes-
thetic ability of human intellect. Th e same can be said about the ability to manipu-
late objects with the aid of certain formulae, in order to achieve (as imagined) the 
predicted results. Th is ability has been realized since time immemorial in cultural 
texts as a phenomenon of magic, from which in turn (in later history) the scientif-
ic research method has been developed. Th e fact that these abilities exist in diff er-
ent combinations in diff erent individuals and during diff erent eras, levels and sig-
nifi cance, and are represented to various degrees of explicitness, is associated with 
the regulating (amplifying, taboo-setting, etc.) function of culture. It could also be 
considered probable that certain communicative forms of intellectual operations 
(there are more) may be inherent. We are of the opinion that the elementary semi-
otic forms, in which these abilities are realized, are formed, modifi ed and become 
more complex in memorized texts (texts to be memorized) and become a part of the 
cultural experience of me.6
In the following we shall proceed from the postulate that the ability to believe is 
also universal, and is realized as an operation of the intellect within a cultural expe-
rience, which we then perceive as belief. 
We will now attempt to clarify which are the formal “grammatical” characteristics 
of belief as an intentional operation of the intellect.
To begin with, some details limiting the topic need to be provided. Belief is treat-
ed as a phenomenon that is manifested in communication, and cases will be ana-
lysed where the addressee of belief is an individualized or personifi ed addressee – 
you. To continue, instead of analysing persuasive belief (resp. conviction) – I believe 
5 Keeping one’s distance, lack of (mercantile) interest, and other such communicative 
characteristics of aesthetic perception are secondary, since their existence, without the basic 
characteristic, does not ensure the creation of an aesthetic relationship. 
6 For more detail about these (and other) universal operations that are inherent in the human 
intellect, see Lepik 2008.
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you, where the essence is to assert the concordance with reality of the circumstances 
relating to the addressee, we will attempt to analyse devotional belief – I believe in 
you, where the substance is the intellect’s form of communication, an intellectual 
relationship to you with certain particular characteristics. In the former case the 
analysis is centred on you – the validity/invalidity of the circumstances associated 
with you [taking into account the measure of trueness (resp. ‘trueness’)]; in the latter 
case the devotional sign-creation relationship of me becomes the focus of attention.
Dedicative belief, as clarifi ed below, is a considerably wider concept than reli-
gious belief: according to formal semiotic characteristics, religiosity (religious belief, 
which in this case will be examined within the limits of Christianity) can be treated 
as a specifi c sub-concept of dedicative belief7. Th erefore, in addition to the religious 
sphere of dedicative belief (belief in god) another dedicative sphere of the intellect 
must be diff erentiated – one that in practice is much wider and more general, and 
which could in some sense be conditionally termed as devotional belief (taking also 
into consideration that devotion does characterize both, but there are substantial dif-
ferences in religious communication, as regards functional and additional character-
istics that are formed within culture). Religious belief is analysed separately, using 
the background of devotional belief (see Section 5). In the following, ‘belief ’ may 
also be used as a term, including the case in which the formal common characteris-
tics of both spheres of dedicative belief are being considered. 
We are of the opinion that in order to determine the formal structure of the 
pheno menon of belief, the fi ve aspects of the applicable communicative act must be 
considered – i.e. orientational, sign-creating, cognitive, teleological and energetic. 
Orientational aspect
As a concept, belief can be treated orientationally as an intentional act, which has a 
horizontal and a vertical dimension. On the one hand, belief expresses – on the hori-
zontal axis of orientation – the durability and continuation (also continuation as the 
recalling) of a certain relationship, and on the other hand – on the vertical axis – be-
lief denotes an acknowledging, exalting, submissive relationship in the direction of a 
certain you. We defend the point of view that such a two-dimensionally interpreted 
mental operation is guaranteed by an intellect-based algorithm, and is universal. In 
cultural texts (in communication), this is manifested as an experience structure that 
has been carved into memory. 
7 dedicare (Lat.) to honour, value highly, dedicate, consecrate.
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Belief as a communicative relationship is simultaneously both retrospective 
(at the moment of the notifi cation ~ cognition – i.e. at present – the belief already 
exists) and also predictive – belief in someone is accepting in advance the future 
of the relationship. Belief is a phenomenon that can be described in a temporal 
manner, which also means that it can be described topologically:8 the durability and 
continuation of a relationship begins in the past and reaches into the future. Th e axis 
of the vertical, submissive, orientation can also be spatially interpreted.
Belief as devotion can be treated as an actually occurring autocommunicative 
act, where you – whom me assesses in a certain way in my thoughts (towards whom 
one experiences devotion, submission, or whom one worships) – can be retrieved 
by me from memory at the moment of the saying ~ thinking. Th erefore, the me – 
me relationship “enters” the me – you relationship. Juri Lotman, in his description 
of autocommunication, has emphasized that although the bearer here of the 
information (me) as an individual remains identical with himself in the relationship 
act, the me interprets the attributed message to the “other” me through the assistance 
of code that is attributed to the text reproducing you. Th us the me – you relationship 
that in the structure of belief has changed into autocommunication becomes 
a vital retuning instrument of me (Lotman 1973: 229). In addition, the me, in his 
imagination, attributes durability and authority to that being said ~ being thought – 
in advance.9 
It is worth noting that the temporal division of horizontal orientation is fi xed in 
the grammatical structure of natural language (and also cultural languages). Roman 
Jakobson has described this using the term ‘evidential’. He demonstrates that this 
term can be used to denote a category of verb that takes into account three facts: 
(1) the fact being notifi ed; (2) the fact of notifi cation; and in addition (3) the fact 
of notifi cation that is being mediated, i.e. denoting the external transmitter of the 
actual transmission of the fact being notifi ed. Th e speaker notifi es an event, either 
based on someone else’s message (a message in the form of a quote that has been 
acquired from someone), a dream (information acquired through revelation), 
assump tions (presentiments) or based on one’s own past experience (information 
retrieved from memory).10 An analogical formal relationship also operates in 
communication expressing belief. Th e subject of the evidentiality here is me 
who reproduces a relationship model that has been stored in memory, fi xed in 
experience. Th e permanent paragon [(archaic) idol, (national) hero, patrum more] 
that has been stored in memory, whose incarnation and continuity is seen in the 
8 Time (e.g. before, aft er) can always be visualized in spatial terms.
9 Boris Uspenskij has justifi ably called autocommunication the “basis of cognitive thought” 
and the mechanism of the “objectifi cation of subjective impressions” (Uspenskij 2007: 10).
10 See Jakobson 1990. 
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actual addressee of communication, can become the subject of evidentiality. Th e 
actual addressee of the communication, however, could be the same as the signifi ed 
paragon, but could also be diff erent. In such a case, there would be two you-s: the 
subject of the evidentiality stored in memory is then you 1, but the actual addressee 
is you 2.11
Sign-creating aspect 
(1) Performative communication. Let us begin with you 2 – in the direction of the 
future expectation. As seen above, ‘believe’ is a semantically indeterminate sign. It is 
only an act with orientational characteristics that explicitly expresses belief. Th e con-
tent of such a determination becomes clearer when one diff erentiates between infor-
mative and performative signs (resp. statements). Informative signs and statements 
express information about the world, but they do not directly relate to the world. 
Th ey do this through natural language, which functions as a virtual, organized and 
relatively closed system with mutually related meanings and where each element’s 
meaning is in a defi nite agreed correlation with the other elements in the system. 
Here the object of reference for the sign (or statement) is natural language, a certain 
fi xed linguistic meaning. Th e relationship of performative signs and statements with 
the world, however, is direct; stating some word or thought is treated here as carry-
ing out an action signifi ed by that word or sentence. Th e object of the reference is 
not the linguistic meaning, but the signifi ed communicative action, i.e. the external 
real act or object of the language system – the denoted, in this case belief in a cer-
tain ‘idol’ etc., as a devotive act. In grammar, performative statements are generally 
formed as being in the present tense, the indicative mood, fi rst person singular (I be-
lieve in you) or in the imperative mood. Examples of a purely performative statement 
can be found in any type of cursing (‘Damn!’, etc.) And it should be emphasized: 
cursing is an action that also expresses belief in the expected eff ect of the action. Th e 
statement I believe in you is therefore performative. It is a (verbal) action forming the 
submissive position and continuity of me – you 2.
11 Th is relationship has been analysed by Martin Buber, in a manner that in part has relevance 
to the devotive treatment of the me – you relationship. “Th e world is twofold for man” Buber 
(1970: 53) says, writing that “When one says You, the I of the word-pair I-You is said, too” 
(Buber 1970: 54). Buber uses the concept of basic word (Grundwort). While it is usually 
the word that is accentuated in a word combination that is considered to be the basic word, 
for Buber basic words are whole word pairs, including me – you. Here, the you role can be 
fi lled by nature, people or spiritual beings (geistige Wesenheiten). Buber (1970: 57), however, 
consistently analyses these communicative relationships in a pantheistic key: “In every sphere 
through everything that becomes present to us [including in you. P.L.] , we gaze toward the 
train of th eternal You; in each we perceive a breath of it; in every You we address the eternal 
You, …”; “Man becomes me through You”.
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(2) Symbol-centred level of expression. Th e autocommunication of me, as well as 
the autocommunicative relationship with you 1 that has been stored in the brain, is a 
certain continuously actual (nonconscious) state. But the me relationship (act) in the 
direction of you 2 must be considered to be the symbol of this implicit position.
Lotman (1987) has written that “historically, the most active symbols have been 
characterized by a certain indetermination between the level of expression of the 
text and the level of content. Th e level of content of the symbol always belongs, 
as regards meaning, to a more multi-dimensional space. Th erefore, the level of 
expression does not denote the content as a whole, but only hints at it”. Nevertheless, 
the “memory image of a symbol is always more ancient than the memory image of 
its text surroundings that are external to the symbol”. A symbol is not a sign that can 
be culturally located. Symbols “appear from the past and fl ow into the future”; they 
reach us by passing through cultural layers without losing their “enclosed meaning”. 
Despite preserving invariancy, the symbol also correlates actively with cultural 
contexts, “is transformed under their infl uence and it also transforms culture”. Th e 
core group of symbols can be “traced back to the era predating humanity’s written 
language, when certain (and elementary, as regards the method of their portrayal) 
signs expressed compressed mnemonic programs about texts and scenarios that the 
collective had preserved in oral memory” (emphasis mine – P. L.). Symbols have 
a “deeply archaic character” (Lotman 1987: 11, 12). Let us consider, for example, 
the modern custom to seal marriage with a ring. Th is symbolic act is an ancient 
phenomenon, and we know that in the time of primitive communities and group 
marriages the marriage vow was sworn to clan members who stood in a circle. Th e 
circle ( > ring) could also, it is believed, symbolize (NB! on the vertical axis) the sun 
as you (resp. you 1),12 and the sun is an object of worship in ancient mythology.
Th e relationship expressing belief of me thus fi nds an explicit expression via 
the me – you 2 topological position. As a symbol, this relationship reproduces the 
worship of a cult object and/or the (archaic) patrum more (you 1). We will proceed 
from the presumption that the devotive act of belief has always been one of the most 
important, and probably central, elements of the mnemonic program. Since time 
immemorial, the initial addressee of belief in diff erent cultures has been a certain 
agens – a personifi ed, sacral symbol – a certain you. And a submissive relationship 
with this has been saved in memory as an implicit, nonconscious cliché. Th e 
experiential schema described, fi xed in cultural memory, seems to be one of the 
factors forming dedicative belief in all people.
A striking example of this is Hamlet’s communication with the ghost of his 
poisoned father in Shakespeare’s tragedy. Th e father’s ghost – you 1 – is indeed 
12 Cf. Hoff mann-Krayer 1987[1935–36]: 703. 713. In addition: the words deus (Lat.), θεός 
(Gr.) ja deva (Hindi) are derived from the root div, which means ‘to shine’.
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explicit here, and the relationship with him has been presented as real and deter-
mined in time: Hamlet communicates with his father “In my mind’s eye” and as 
willed by Shakespeare (Hamlet, Act 1) in the courtyard. Th is relationship culmi-
nates as an autocommunicative approach towards you 2, whom Shakespeare has 
as a projection of me (resp. autocommunicative me 2!) that wants to aspire to the 
heights of you 1 (the father). Me 1, who comprehends the high principles of you 1, 
submissively addresses himself, fi lled with profound belief and hope in the success 
of his revenge that will be unfolding over the fi ve acts. Hamlet, talking to himself, 
believes that only the me, cleansed of “trivial fond records” – and in whom only the 
“commandment” of you 1, carved into memory and serving the future, “shall live” – 
can become you 2 (alias me 2): 
O all you host of heaven! O earth! What else?
And shall I couple hell? O fi e! Hold, hold, my heart,
And you, my sinews, grow not instant old,
But bear me stiffl  y up. Remember thee?
Ay, thou poor ghost [---]
Yea, from the table of my memory
I’ll wipe away all trivial fond records,
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past
Th at youth and observation copied there,
And thy commandment all alone shall live
Within the book and volume of mu brain,
Unmixt with baser matter: yes, by heaven! 
(Shakespeare 1996: 678)
Hamlet’s further actions (Th e Mousetrap, etc.) are encouraged by a belief in me, ex-
hibited as you 2, who must restore the continuity of the high principles of you 1 in 
the kingdom.
Cognitive aspect
Th e relationship of you 1 with you 2, as a cognitive act of me, is mythological. 
Mircea Eliade confi rms mythological thinking, saying that in this “an object or an 
act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an archetype. Th us, reality [in 
our example, the relationship with you 2 – P.L.] is acquired solely through repetition 
[remembering – P.L.] [of the me – you 1 relationship – P.L.] or participation; 
everything which lacks an exemplary model is ‘meaningless’, in other words – it lacks 
reality” (Eliade 1959a: 34). Th e relationship to you 1 can be experienced as a certain 
initial state. 
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In describing cultural phenomena, Lotman has emphasized that the generally 
recognized mythologism of a child’s consciousness “does not disappear, nor should 
it do so, from the consciousness structure of an adult. Th is continues to function as 
a generator of associations and as one of the active modelling mechanisms. Ignoring 
this would render it impossible to understand adult behaviour” (Lotman 1978: 8). 
Th is line of argument permits the treatment of the me relationship with you 1 and 
you 2 as communication acts that are simultaneous, logically on the same level and 
mythologically identical.  At the same time it can even be intuitively grasped that 
there is a hierarchy of values between me and you 2, which fi nds expression in the 
fact that me puts into words a relationship with you 2 (be it anyone specifi cally) by 
“looking up to him” [by equating it with a normative (resp. archetypical) me – you 1 
relationship]. Belief in the addressee is an exalting or submissive act being repeated 
by me.
Teleological aspect
Indeed, belief symbolizes, exalts and mythologizes durability and continuity. Th e at-
tentive reader has no doubt noticed that the analysis so far has not posed the ques-
tion as to whether exalting continuity is only limited to the concept of ‘belief ’ or if 
its fi eld of implementation and function is wider than ‘belief ’ in the structure of the 
individual and culture? It is even intuitively clear that the relationship, for example, 
of hope and love with the object of attention, whom one places hope on, and/or loves 
(and why not also honours, worships, exalts, etc.), is not conceivable without belief in 
this object. And vice versa – devotive belief in someone is invalid without hope and 
devotion. Th e same can be said for magic. It is apparent that this particular nest of 
concepts is mutually connected, both structurally and functionally. Paul Tillich has 
indicated that the wise people from the late ancient period considered faith, hope 
and love to be “spiritual gift s” that are characteristic of “the internal purpose of be-
ing human” , i.e. of the telos, and we could add – of the existential projection to the 
future, keeping in mind the patrum more values13. It can therefore be admitted that 
belief as an ability of the intellect has an extensive existential basis in the structure of 
identity. Th e autocommunicative nature of this internal purpose becomes apparent 
particularly vividly in Hamlet’s speech. Belief is one of the measuring sticks for hu-
man self-determination.
13 Tillich, in diff erentiating between the concepts ‘existential’ and ‘existentialism’, claims 
that in contrast to the latter, which refers to the school of philosophy, ‘existential’ denotes an 
attitude and an act of thinking where the thinker has not distanced himself from his object but 
has merged with it (Tillich 1963b: 26). 
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Energetic aspect
Another aspect of the intellectual ability under observation is associated with the 
structure of belief – the energetic potential directed at and focused on the addressee – 
you 2 – and in certain cases it could be called the power of belief. In language phi-
losophy this intellectual aspect interlocks with the problems associated with cre-
ative energy (energeia) and with what is created (ergon), to borrow from Wilhelm 
Humboldt. Pavel Florenskij, keeping in mind the word ‘magicality’, has claimed that, 
on the one hand, a word is closed “in a powerless and unreal subjectivity”, but on 
the other hand, a word is a signal, a certain ‘energy’. As soon as a word happens to 
enter a “live fl ow of speech”, it “becomes alive and is fi lled with an internal power 
and meaning” (Florenskij 1999: 231, 233, 239). Th e source of the wide-ranging en-
ergetic potential of belief can be the ‘creative power’ that is equated to you 1, the 
mythological fellowship relationship with certain values-symbols, the orientational 
position of the object of the belief in the me value system, and of course the possible 
(conscious or unconscious) projection of me on the amplifying orientational axis. 
Concentrating on belief tends to change the me into an energetic dominant.
It follows on from the above arguments that devotional belief is a submissive rela-
tionship with the addressee, who is perceived as a symbol of the existential continuity 
of me.
Belief as an ability of the intellect and an applicable experience is realized in com-
munication as a semiotic code. It should, however, be said that this code should be 
interpreted as a ‘grammatical’ norm. In actual (auto)communication (in texts) it may 
be dispersed into variants, in which the various aspects of belief are manifested with 
various intensity and explicitness, and may merge with the rational characteristics of 
persuasive belief. But this is already empiricism, whose typological and sociological 
fi eld of implementation remains outside the bounds of this analysis. 
5. Phenomenological boundaries of religious belief
Next, it is our task to examine whether and how the fi ve aspects of belief, as an abil-
ity of the intellect that we have considered above, are manifest in the religious belief 
that over the centuries has crystallized into canonical form.
We claim that all belief-based communication characteristics hold a central 
meaning – including in the religious form of dedicative belief, and that they fi nd 
there a signed expression in communication acts, where the participants are derived 
from the scriptures.
In beginning the comparison, it should be emphasized that the reduction to the 
formal characteristics described in Section 4 creates a schema that understandably 
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simplifi es a religious discourse that is complex, capacious, and thousands of years 
old. But our task is indeed limited to diff erentiating the structural characteristics of 
religious communication, in order to assert their analogy, and the intellect-based 
experience’s relationship with devotional belief. Th e expected analogies should per-
mit the claim that the intellectual ability to believe is also the natural precondition for 
forming the experience of religious belief. In doing so, the argument of semiotic analy-
sis should always be kept in mind: the possible me-external powers (here the teach-
ings of God, the actions of Christ and the power of the Spirit) can be described as 
such since the me intellect fi xes them in a signifi ed manner. At the same time, an 
understanding should also arise that devotional and religious belief, which are anal-
ogous according to their formal characteristics, are indeed present in the practice of 
cultural communication, side by side with sovereign discourses, which nevertheless 
may merge with one another in the practice of communication.
Orientational aspect
Th e orientational aspect applies closely to the topological position of You in rela-
tion to me, on the horizontal and vertical relationship axis. Such a positioning of the 
question proceeds from the hypothesis (see Section 4) that the experience of devo-
tional belief is based on the algorithm of the intellect and has been fi xed in the mem-
ory of culture (or an individual) into a relationship with a certain durable you. And 
this is highly rated in experience, proceeds from the past and reaches into the future 
(on the horizontal axis) and has a submissive relationship denoting steadiness (on 
the vertical axis). Both axes of orientation also hold a central meaning in the dogma 
of Christianity, and are recurringly accentuated.
On the horizontal axis the passing of time, together with the appearance of a bib-
lical God, acquires, in the consciousness of individuals, a linear and purposeful di-
rection of movement from a defi nite (although indeterminate in time) starting point 
(world creation) to a defi nite end point (Day of Judgment). Th is is a “historical” de-
velopment path with many unique key points “before the birth of Christ” and “aft er 
the birth of Christ”. It is related to Providence (centrally through the atoning cruci-
fi xion of Jesus Christ), and is also eschatological, and its existential accent is on the 
future.
In mediating the word of the Bible from the past to the present and the future, 
the Christian message acquires characteristics denoting durability on the horizontal 
axis,14 which is given a specifi c meaning by the fundamental concept of the Trinity. 
14 Th is claim will be clarifi ed in the course of examining the cognitive aspect of religious 
belief.
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According to this, the Trinity is divided into hypostases (states): Father – you, 
Beginning With No Beginning, whose attributes are memory and the past; Son – 
Me, Logos, Absolute Th ought, whose attributes are thinking and the present,  and the 
Holy Spirit – Him, Source of Resurrection, whose attributes are love and the future 
(Averintsev 1982: 527) – “genuineness of the expected one” (St Paul). 
But in addition to the devotional relationship with God, and the Christ-event on 
the horizontal axis that can be ‘historically’ interpreted, its refl ection in the religious 
existential relationship to me – which can also be analysed in time-space, durability-
related categories, embracing both the ‘beginning’ and the ‘end’ – is just as impor-
tant. In this context, it is important to ask what has been the universal and specifi c 
purpose of religious belief from the point of view of being human, the durability of 
me, the human self-image – keeping in mind the beginning and the end of life. It is 
indeed clear that belief in God and Jesus Christ could not consistently survive just 
being supported by the Bible as story-telling, by mystical curiosity, fear, manners or 
mass behaviour. History convinces us that, for the religious, religiosity had to be in 
a certain way consistently, even inherently necessary from the point of view of dura-
bility. Religious communication is accompanied by the religious person’s constant, 
everyday predisposition to share in the grace of You, to listen to teachings, repent, 
confi rm the faith, atone for sin. Tillich emphasizes that the word ‘sin’, which has be-
come simplifi ed and made “unfi t for use” in the popular-religious language use, does 
not denote morality in classical Christianity but is a “religious concept that inciden-
tally also has moral consequences”. He notes that the “contrast between oneself and 
one’s true nature – alienation from oneself – is the inevitable manifestation of hu-
man existence” (Tillich 1990: 256). Th e horizontal relationship axis, as the tempo-
ral and historical path of becoming free from alienation resp. atoning for sin, is in 
Christianity a complex of acts that are cult-like in formation, and celebrated with 
rituals and sacraments. It is, according to religious tenets, the path through which a 
person attains humanness and his own essence.
Th e vertical relationship axis, and the heavens, located above and the source of 
the warmth and the water that gives life, has been the most important part of the 
expanse, starting from ancient imagination. On the semiotic plane, the topological 
characteristics of heavens can be divided into spatial (height, distance, size, immu-
tability) and evaluative (unattainable, vigour, severity, subordinating, majestic, sov-
ereignty) ones. Th e heaven has also been considered to be the home of the gods, and 
the described vertical characteristics have always – in this or that variation – char-
acterized gods as the sublime addressees of the me – you relationship. In the New 
Testament, Jesus Christ is called upon to create and mediate communication be-
tween the earth below and the heavens above. 
In the context of these topological opinions, the communication between the 
individual and heavenly powers is also examined. Taking into account the extent, 
 (Religious) belief and atheism from a semiotic viewpoint  65
superiority and indeterminateness of these forces, a person cannot treat these by 
excluding the submissiveness and devotion of me, or the giving of oneself or the 
reverence. 
Sign-creating aspect
(1) Performative communication. Paul Tillich writes that the term “God” is best un-
derstood as the answer to the ultimate concern of a fi nite human being, and adds 
two noteworthy comments. Tillich claims that “this does not mean that fi rst there is 
a being called God and then the demand that man should be ultimately concerned 
about him. It means: that, which undoubtedly concerns a person, becomes for that 
person a God (or idol)” (Tillich 1963a: 211). Tillich continues to explain his claim 
thus: “[g]ods are not objects within the context of the universe. Th ey are expressions 
of the ultimate concern which transcends the cleavage between subjectivity and ob-
jectivity (here and above, my emphasis – P.L.)” (Tillich 1963a: 214). Proceeding from 
the communicative and sign-creation context, it can fi rstly be concluded that the ‘ul-
timate’ must be something that has left  a trace in the me memory – this is either the 
intellect’s programmed relationship model and/or the symbol or code text that can 
be taken from a person’s experience;15 and secondly that, which the “ultimate con-
cerns”, is not decipherable on the level of informative signs – it fi nds expression in 
the communication between me and God – in a certain devotional act . And, thirdly, 
since this devotional act is not decipherable on the level of informative signs, it is 
then a case of informative indetermination – a performative communication act in 
which the meaning can be reduced to the expressed act, ad hoc. Th is act is gener-
ally called prayer. Tillich emphasizes that the “me-you relationship between God and 
man [holds] a fundamental meaning for the religious experience” (Tillich 1963a: 
222). Religious belief is not knowing or philosophizing about God, it is communica-
tion with God as an act. Th e informative indetermination of this act is interpreted in 
theological writings as a phenomenon, which lies beyond the limits of “ordinary ex-
perience”: “[g]ods are beings who transcend the realm of ordinary experience in pow-
er and meaning, with whom men have relations which surpass ordinary relations in 
intensity and signifi cance (my emphasis – P.L.)” (Tillich 1963a: 212). 
15 Lotman called code text a certain syntagmatic whole, where the code itself has risen to 
fulfi l the role of the content of the text, reducing the informative proportion of the text to a 
minimum (as it occurs for example in a fairy tale or a crime novel). See Lotman 1988: 4–6. 
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2. Symbol-centred level of expression 
As a symbol (here we are referring to Lotman’s symbol analysis, as discussed above), 
God (the sign) belongs to the complex “mnemonic program” of culture, in which the 
level of expression only “hints at the level of content”, which, in the memories of me 
and culture, belongs, compared to signed expression, to the “more multidimensional 
space” and which is actualized in religious communication.
Th erefore, an ‘act of God’ ‘in us’ or an expression ‘about God’ is a symbolic 
sign expression recorded in the memory of me about God as You. But God as You 
reaches the actual imagination of me mostly through referencing – mediated by 
other yous, which means that communication repeats the evidential (you 1) and 
actual (you 2) relationship schema (See Section 4, Orientational aspect) as described 
by Roman Jakobson. Th e other yous are fi rstly Jesus Christ, whom God, according 
to the scriptures, let be born on Earth, “for in him dwelleth all the fullness of the 
Godhead bodily” (Col 2: 9). However, there are other yous that could also have 
evidentiality to God (through Christ): Christ’s disciples and prophets or priests from 
a church pulpit. Evidentiality to God reaches (have reached) me either in the form 
of normative texts from the scriptures and/or in the form of rhetoric, or through the 
symbolizing medium of written and visual art, and music. Th us does the word of 
God and Christ reach the mind of the believers, through multiple mediations.
In summarizing this discussion using semiotic terms, it could be said that 
communication with addressees in a religious discourse is symbolic, indeterminate 
as regards information, and, as a rule, evidential (‘hinting’). Th is symbolicity is also 
emphasized by the later formation of texts (‘books’, ‘acts’, ‘gospels’) as ‘chapters’ and 
‘verses’. Each fragment of texts (also verses) in the Bible can in principle be treated as 
an independent symbol since it has both an iconic (pictorial) as well as an indexical 
(referencing) formal structure. Th e iconicity of the verse consists in the sameness of 
the excerpt of text that is seen or heard with that whichis holy in the eyes of the 
believer. Th e indexicality of the verse consists of referencing, the ‘evidence’ of 
something/someone greater, more multidimensional, undetermined in words. Th is 
is analogous to the way in which, for example, the me listens to the national anthem 
standing up references the state as something whose value “cannot be expressed in 
words” – something that is in the “heart” of me, as is customarily said in such cases. 
As is, in principle, any verse in the Bible, as well as the index of the entire scriptures, 
just as the title of a book is the index of the work that it denotes. We join Mircea 
Eliade in also keeping in mind that in communication a “religious symbol conveys 
its message even if it is no longer consciously understood in every part. For a symbol 
speaks to the whole human being (the “multidimensional” and “indeterminate” 
person – P.L.) and not only to the intelligence” (Eliade 1959b: 129). A person, as a 
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being “created in the image of God” can (if s/he can…) in this context be considered 
as a (divine) symbol of God.
Th eologians generally agree that the semantic common denominator of religious 
symbols, which diff erentiate them from the other, profane, symbols, is that which 
is holy. “Holiness is a quality of ultimate concern”, claims Tillich and adds that 
“humans cannot have ultimate concern in something unless it has the quality of 
holiness [emphasis – P.L.]” (Tillich 1963a: 215). Topologically – on the value scale – 
the me relationship with holiness is therefore defi nitely a characteristic of submissive 
devotion. Th is viewpoint is also in accordance with the standpoints in Section 4, 
which could now be extended with the realization that the objects of devotional 
belief (e.g. the one being loved) may also acquire, as regards formal characteristics, 
the symbolic halo of holiness.
Cognitive aspect
Communication with the yous in religious discourse, as regards cognitive charac-
teristics, is mythological – analogous with the relationship in devotional belief (see 
Section 4 for details). In the context of mythological communication, this is a case 
of a certain proto-form, archetype repeating/being repeated. And the equalizing 
mechanism, which is characteristic of mythological thought, permits the me to feel 
in these events a fellowship in the present, to devotionally identify with them.
Th e act of mythological thought changes the past and the future into the pres-
ent on the horizontal axis and brings God from the heights ‘into’ me. Th e evidential 
Yous merge, with the support of mythological thought, into One – the Holy Trinity 
addressee, with whom the believer identifi es in prayer and feels a submissive fellow-
ship. It is quite clear that mythological thought and myths as the subject of mytho-
logical thought, is the organic, central characteristic of religious belief.
In such an act of mythological thought, me perceives holy objects (including de-
votive you 1) as a part of oneself. Th is is autocommunication. Due to fellowship and 
being-as-one with this autocommunicative image, the me-picture rises, in me eyes, 
to an uplift ed position on the value scale. An autocommunicative relationship with 
moral values that are considered to be holy leaves an unavoidably valued mark on 
the self-image of me. Lotman emphasizes that a “text in the communication canal 
me – me has a tendency to be saturated with individual meanings and to become an 
organizer of dispersed associations that have been deposited in a person’s conscious-
ness. It retunes the person that has entered autocommunication” (Lotman 1973: 
236). 
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Teleological and energetic aspect
In the existential sense, the religious worldview is completely teleological: the be-
liever’s life process and its structure are determined, from the viewpoint of me, by 
God’s Providence, prophetic signs, the act of resurrection and awaiting the Messiah, 
which has a transcendental destination. Th e Bible’s vision of this process is dramatic, 
but directed towards the future and selectively optimistic – for those who feel faith, 
hope and love towards the Creator, fi nd in themselves their telos as their inner pur-
pose [“For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you” 
(Matt 10: 20)], and in submissive accordance with this go to meet their salvation. 
Th e energetic aspect of religious belief is also expressed in the above, which provides 
a sanctifi ed force and a constantly real purpose to the strivings and words of the be-
liever, creates a certain absolute projection, which, as regards the profane reality, has 
dimensions that are distant, high in the value sense and cosmic in the spatial plane. 
Th is projection is the path that is followed in the form of mythological reference, 
and mostly in autocommunicative form. In addition, the energy force of belief is, in 
interaction with mythological reference, capable of dominating ‘blindly’ in a person’s 
consciousness.
Bringing the above into the context of the characteristics we have been analys-
ing, it can be stated that sin is a teleological and energetic concept. Sin is the symbol 
of not being in conformity with the inner purpose of me. Th is seems to conceal the 
signifi cant point of contact between divinus and humanus, between the devotional 
belief that rises above the profane everyday consciousness and religious belief. Th e 
problem in humanistic culture of not being in accordance with the essence of a per-
son has remained constantly on the agenda, and religious belief must be considered 
to have played a major role in this.
Hopefully we have succeeded, through this analysis, in proving that religious be-
lief (religiosity) is, according to its formal characteristics, analogous with devotional 
belief, which is the natural ability of a person’s intellect, and whose formal charac-
teristics have been described here as elements of a universal algorithm. In contrast 
to devotional belief, religious belief focuses on the relationship with the unique You, 
which on the vertical axis of communication embodies absolute values, and on the 
horizontal axis – eternity. Religious myths, as a plentiful, organized collection of 
symbols that has been formed over the centuries and deposited in the cultural mem-
ory, is a sovereign world, where all the Yous are oriented to show the way for the 
mythological realization of the inner purpose (telos) of me and for binding fate with 
eternity – in the name of the immortality of the soul. Such an orientation could be 
said to raise religious discourse to a higher level than the profane level of culture and 
to attribute to it an exclusive position on the value scale. Th e submissive relationship 
with the scripture’s Yous that is expressed mostly in autocommunicative acts permits 
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the me to feel fellowship with the world, which through devotion dignifi es and har-
monizes the notion of me of himself and creation, and binds him with the universe. 
For a believer, God is the symbol of the existential durability of me.
Devotional belief is one of the recorded forms of the relationship between me 
and the (concealed) world.
6. How to describe the formal characteristics of atheism? 
Unfortunately we must begin with admitting that a concept of atheism that is com-
plete and scientifi cally creditable just does not exist. And atheism’s apologists, in 
emphasizing the scientifi city of atheism, have chronically missed the mark because, 
fi rstly, they have not taken into account that, once they are taken out of context, the 
facts of a myth lose their initial meaning and function that is based on a certain and 
defi nite structural whole. Th e facts of a myth (also the myth of Christianity), as we 
have recognized, are symbolic and cognitively mythological: for example, immortal-
ity, the resurrection of Christ etc. cannot be interpreted in terms of natural science 
(and the believer indeed does not interpret them so); and, secondly, scientifi cally 
competent arguments to dispute or prove the actual existence of God and immortal-
ity do not exist. 
Nevertheless, the attempts to criticize religiosity have always been based on 
science – always in the mantra-like context of “common sense” and “progress”. 
Atheists, as we know, have always considered faith to be “medieval mind blindness” 
and have emphasized the triumph and priority of practical, “earthly values”.
Let us now look at how to formalize the characteristics that have been used to 
describe atheism.
It is noticeable how the authors of atheistic texts tend to compensate for their 
scientifi cally fragile arguments with an emotional and aimless, sometimes even 
mocking, feeling of superiority. Th e roots of this style go back to the Enlightenment. 
Th eoretically speaking, this is an antithetic structure of thought, using a thought 
algorithm that is inherently characteristic of the intellect – a mirror projection, 
according to which the addressee, in this case the explicit ‘contemptibility’, ‘in-
adequacy’ and ‘sinfulness’ of priests resp. believers, is contrasted with the addresser 
who has self-evident dignity, intelligence and morality. Th e content of the meaning 
of the addressee, as a sign, is formed in a contradictory manner: following on 
from the “minus sign” alias no alias left  there is the “plus sign” alias yes alias right – 
as an automatic symmetrical antithesis – in a mirror, so to speak.16 Th e fi eld of 
imple mentation of such a thought process in culture is rather extensive, and 
16 For more detail on the antithetic operations of the intellect, see Lepik 2008: 62–91.
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characteristic of not only atheism. It begins, metaphorically speaking, in the kitchen 
and extends to the political ideology of totalitarian regimes. 
Karl Marx has quite knowingly and explicitly used such polarization and 
judgmentalism in defi ning atheism. Even up to this day, his atheistic thought schema 
has had a widespread eff ect, which justifi es our delving into the topic.
In analysing God-denial in the workers’ movement, Marx claims directly that “at-
heism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through this nega-
tion“ (Marx 1975: 306). In the Introduction to his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right, Marx, in the spirit of materialist monism, denies God as a “fi ctitious person”, 
a “non-person”, the distorted refl ection of a person, and contrasts to this a person’s 
“true earthly being”. He also denies the “fantastic reality of heaven”, contrasting it to 
the “true reality that man seeks and must seek”. He calls the 19th-century bourgeois 
society, in which a person must do the seeking, a ‘false world’, which encourages the 
survival of a distorted worldview, but which – again a contrast – would disappear 
once socialism is born. Th is claim, however, is topped by Marx’s line of argument on 
the 19th century bourgeois society’s ‘general theory’. Th is, he claims, is religion, which 
also is the “encyclopaedic compendium” (i.e. a summarized handbook) of society, 
“its logic in popular form /.../ its moral sanction” (Marx 1970: 3). In using such a 
thought construct, Marx then equates religion and political ideology. He also equates 
religiosity, as a form of communication, with the ideological actions of (religious) 
institutions. 
From the logic of antithetic constructions there follows the symmetricity of the 
plus-side topological characteristics of antithetic postulates with the minus-side 
characteristics. Th e characteristics affi  rmed by Marx can be clearly positioned on 
the vertical and horizontal axes, on the basis of the same logic that we described 
in the analysis of religious belief. For Marx, the vertical axis discloses the “true 
earthly essence” of a person – analogous to the minus-side’s true essence as created 
by God: “Th e criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and 
fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his sen-
ses, so that he will move around himself as his own true Sun,” writes Marx (1843–
1844)17. Of course, the symbolic expression “true Sun” should be interpreted as 
a person’s freedom, the highly rated social value, and dignity, because “man is the 
world of man – state, society” (Marx 1843–1844). Keeping in mind symmetricality, 
I cannot agree with Paul Tillich’s claim that the vertical axis is missing in Marxism 
(Tillich 1990: 260). Indeed, whereas in Marx’s mental image of the 19th century 
the imaginary “true earthly essence” can be considered, with reservation, to be 
“vertically transcendental”, then in the Marxism of totalitarian societies, a “forever 
17 Karl Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is available at. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm.
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living” image of a dictator is created, that supersedes the functions of God and 
embodies all of the essential (= godly) virtues, and is appointed as an obligatory and 
the most highly rated reference model in the “world of man”. Th e horizontal axis of 
Marx’s thought schema – the course of history from the present (capitalism) to the 
future (communism) expresses the inevitable purposefulness of a person’s existence, 
which is analogical to the trajectory of existence from the earthly realm to the realm 
of a thousand years of peace. According to Marx, religion that has been connived 
by the “false world” will disappear with the coming of socialism (communism) that 
is revolutionary in substance, just as, in the Christians’ opinion, the sinful “fallen 
existence” will disappear. 
In introducing the future dimension of existence, Marx poses a question 
about how to achieve the “true essence” of a person by “changing” the world. 
“Revolutionary practice” is placed on the agenda, man interfering in the formation 
of his future: the confl ict between the essence of a person and existence,  and the 
problem of how to overcome this (Marx 1958: 5–7). In this confl ict, Marx proceeds 
from a noteworthy analysis of alienation. 
Th e phenomenon that is encompassed by the concept of alienation has two 
aspects – a historically inevitable one, which in Marx’s opinion is interlocked with 
the development in society of production relations and production forces, which 
are outside a person’s will; and an instrumental one, which depends on a person’s 
revolutionary will. Marx proceeds from the postulate that man is born free, but 
in class society, due to the pressure of private property and particularly of the 
capitalistic production relations, he has become a commodity, has been objectifi ed, 
has lost his personality, and, instead of “real happiness” is prepared to be satisfi ed 
with “illusory happiness” – and this is primarily religion (Marx 1970: 3). An actual 
phenomenon is therefore examined: a person in a capitalist society has become 
alienated from his essence. Reverting to the essence can, in Marx’s opinion, only take 
place in a class-free society that is free from exploitation.
A person’s liberation, including liberation from religiosity, becomes the fi nale of 
historical development in Marx’s analysis. Th en social and individual harmony will 
enter into force. Since historical materialism does not recognize an alternative path 
of development for society that would exclude communism, and since communism 
is portrayed as an antithetic future projection that is in contrast to the present, one 
must admit that, according to formal characteristics, this fi nale is analogous to the 
overcoming of religious alienation in Christianity. Paul Tillich, who has rated Marx’s 
alienation-themed arguments highly, notes that “Marx persists in the prophet-
like tradition” (Tillich 1990: 260). To this, Tillich adds a profound observation on 
the structure of culture: “it is only possible to comprehend humanum, to its proto-
roots, through divinum – even when it has knowingly uprooted itself ” (Tillich 
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1990: 260). Indeed, in both Christianity and in Marxism, “man as the fi nal freedom 
comes into confl ict with his essence during the process of moving [from paradise 
resp. from pristine communism18. P.L.] into reality” (Tillich 1990: 252). In both cases, 
the teleological fi nale that follows can be treated as a utopian resp. eschatological 
phenomenon – as crossing the bounds to communism resp. the thousand-year realm 
of peace. Christianity, too, has the “idea of the ‘historic moment’ [---] the coming of 
the times when the decisive historical event becomes possible [---] the ‘right time’ – 
kairos, which is unique and during which the turnaround from the existential fall 
to a state of salvation [i.e. the true essence – P.L.] takes place” (Tillich 1990: 259). All 
this has permitted Bertrand Russell claim that “Marx professed himself an atheist, but 
retained a cosmic optimism which only theism could justify” (Russell 1945: 789).
Tillich states that the “smart theologians have always been reluctant to say any-
thing specifi c about paradise, i.e. they have not off ered thorough teachings on the 
essence of man” (Tillich 1990: 254). Th e same could be said of the communist 
formation, which in Marx’s vision is an indistinct antithetic reconstruction of the 
capitalist world. However, all this does not provide us with a reason to equate the 
formal structures of Marxist and Christian alienation, or of atheism and theism.  
What is much more important for the whole of our analysis are the structural 
diff erences between Marx’s atheist and the Christians’ religious ways of thinking. 
Marx treats the alienated essence of a person as an historical precedent – the 
universal characteristics of this phenomenon do not interest him since he treats 
the essence as a result of historical formation. In setting such a criterion, however, 
he comes into confl ict with the initial presumption: if a person is born free, then 
this freedom must also have certain universal characteristics that proceed from 
the person himself, of which one can be aware even before the “re-setting” of the 
essence.
Tillich treats alienation in Christianity as a universal fate and guilt that has 
been accompanying man throughout the ages (Tillich 1990: 251–254). Th e cardinal 
diff erence from Marxism is also that, for a Marxist, the “right time” comes as a result 
of the teamwork between many societal factors, and is projected onto the future, 
whereas, for every Christian the “right time” is also the everyday striving towards 
this essence, with personal, intimate eff orts – through prayer and despite all external 
18 Reference to pristine communism (this would understandably be the formal analogy to 
paradise) does exist in Marx’s manuscripts, but this idea nevertheless remained marginal for 
him.
factors. Being freed from Marxist and Christian alienation is, in the former case, 
being freed from God – denial, and in the second case, reaching God – affi  rmation.
But nevertheless, the structure of Marx’s atheism – as strange as it might seem – 
as regards the general formal characteristics, is recurrently in accordance with 
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the characteristics of devotional belief as described in Section 4. Th e character 
of the horizontal and vertical orientational axes of Marx’s atheism was also 
discussed previously. On the sign-creation plane, Marx describes communism, 
using symbols (“true sun”, “genuine happiness”, “true reality”, “man’s true earthly 
essence”, etc.), which implicitly mediates the patrum more – you 1 values from 
primeaval communism. On the level of informative signs, the referenced symbols 
are in their meaning elements of indistinct performative constructions (“that man 
could revolve around himself as his own true sun”; “true reality that man seeks and 
must seek”; “the point of departure for socialism is man’s theoretical and practical 
sense consciousness and nature as essence”, etc.). Th e atheistic discourse presented 
by Marx is also mythological on the cognitive plane since the sentences and 
concepts that he uses lack meta-linguistic equivalents. Expressions used to describe 
communism are object-linguistic, they do have an output to the metalinguistic 
level. Th e fi nalistic, teleological character of Marx’s communism has already been 
discussed above. 
Th e circle has been completed, and the moral is straightforward: the rational, 
scientifi cally organized world is not the only world “that man seeks and must seek”. 
In denying religion and religiosity, atheism has chronically ignored the intellectual 
specifi cs of religion and religiosity, the communicative role in the structure of 
personality and human community, and the functions in culture. On the basis 
of the analysis, we could realize that, as a singular ability in relating to the world, 
dedicational belief – and devotional and religious belief, as its sub-categories – is one 
of the indisputably central intellectual instruments of an individual’s self-regulation 
(positive self-image and its projective duration), intellectual homeostasis and em-
pathy. Th e “blindness” that excludes the rationality of belief is disturbing only for 
those who think that the intellect of a normal person consists wholly of rational and 
“scientifi c” thought and that a person is born into this world as a blank canvas.
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(Религиозная) вера и атеизм с семиотической точки зрения 
В статье предпринята попытка исследовать с точки зрения семиотики интеллектуаль-
ные характеристики веры: веры в широком значении этого слова (как признания чего-
либо истинным), религиозной веры и атеизма. Эти три аспекта автор рассматривает в 
качестве знаковых систем – языков культуры. В результате анализа выявляется спец-
ифическая «грамматика».
Чтобы определить формальную структуру феномена религиозной веры следует 
учесть пять аспектов коммуникативного акта: ориентационный, семиозисный (sign-
creational), когнитивный, телеологический и энергетический. Вера как ориентацион-
ный акт немыслима вне автокоммуникации: отношение «я – ты» преобразуется то-
пологически, выявляя вертикальные и горизонтальные проекции отношения «я – я». 
Семиозисный аспект веры проявляется в коммуникации с одной стороны в качестве 
перформативных признаков высказывания (высказывание = поступок), а с другой – 
в символически построенных мнемонических программах. Вера как когнитивный акт 
мифологична, она выражена в идентификации себя с адресатом и в субьективно пони-
маемой вневременности этой связи. Вера как телеология связывается с экзистенциаль-
ной проекцией и вера как энергия интерпретируется в качестве созидательной силы – 
energeia. На основе изучения Священного Писания и богословской литературы (глав-
ным образом работ Пауля Тиллиха) в статье рассматривается присутствие указанных 
коммуникативных особенностей также в религиозном семиозисе.
В случае с атеизмом формально налицо структура антитетического мышления, 
признаком которой является симметричная противоположность интеллектуальных 
характеристик сторон со знаком плюс и знаком минус. Особенно интересно наблю-
дать, как Маркс (вкупе с его последователями) не пренебрегает структурной логикой 
явления, которое он отрицает, и как дедикативная структура мышления рождает зем-
ных богов. 
(Religioosne) usk ja ateism semiootilisest vaatepunktist
Artiklis kirjeldatakse usku, religioossust ja jumalaeitamist (ateismi) semiootilisest vaate-
punktist. Vaadeldakse nende kui kultuurikeelte – seega siis märgisüsteemide – formaalseid, 
“grammatilisi” põhitunnuseid. Usku käsitletakse intentsionaalse fenomenina ja selle formaal-
se ehituse määratlemisel arvestatakse vastava kommunikatiivse akti viit – orientatsioonilist, 
märgiloomelist, kognitiivset, teleoloogilist ja energeetilist – aspekti. Niisugune lähenemi-
ne ei vastanda religioossuse intellektipõhist käsitust teoloogilisele, sest ka kõik teispoolne ja 
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ilmutuslik saab põhimõtteliselt inimese mõtteisse jõuda üksnes märgilisel kujul ja intellekt 
fi kseerib need märgiliste struktuuridena.
Usku kui orientatsioonilist akti ei saa käsitada autokommunikatsiooni välistades: mina–
sina suhtesse “sisenebˮ mina–mina suhe vertikaalsete ja horisontaalsete topoloogiliste ku-
jutelmadena. Usu märgiloomeline aspekt avaldub ühest küljest lausungite performatiivsetes 
tunnustes (lausung = tegu) ja teisalt sümbolipärases mnemoonilises programmeerituses. 
Kognitiivse aktina on usuomane kommunikatsioon mütoloogiline, väljendades adressaadi ga 
samastumist ja suhte subjektiivset igikestvust. Teleoloogiliselt on usk seotud eksistentsiaalse 
projektsiooniga ja energeetiliselt käsitame usku energeiana – inimese loova jõuna. Pühakirjale 
ja teoloogilisele kirjandusele (valdavalt Paul Tillichi teostele) toetudes analüüsitakse kõigi 
osutatud kommunikatiivsete tunnuste esinemist religioosses märgiloomes. 
Ateismi puhul on formaalselt tegemist antiteetilise mõtlemisstruktuuriga, mille tunnuseks 
on pluss-poole sümmeetrilisus miinus-poole intellektuaalsete tunnustega. Usu tunnuste alu-
sel on eriti huvitav jälgida, kuidas Marx ja tema jüngrid on “sisustanudˮ ateismi orientatsioo-
nilisi, teleoloogilisi ja energeetilisi tunnuseid ning kuidas mõtlemise dedikatiivne struktuur 
on sünnitanud ka maised jumalad. 
 
